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Frequent flyer breach of contract claims escape
preemption
by Melissa Jerves
In American Airlines, Inc.
v. Wolens, 115 S.Ct. 817 (1995), the
United States Supreme Court held
that the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978 ("ADA") preemption provision
bars actions brought under stateimposed regulation of air carriers,
but permits court enforcement of
contract terms set by the parties
themselves.
The plaintiffs in this case
were participants in American
Airlines' frequent flyer program,
AAdvantage, in which they earned
mileage credits when they flew on
American. Credits could be exchanged for flight tickets or class-ofservice upgrades. The plaintiffs
protested that 1988 changes in the
AAdvantage program devalued
credits they had already earned by
imposing blackout dates when
credits could not be used and by
limiting the number of seats
available to passengers with tickets
obtained with mileage credits.
Plaintiffs conceded that American
reserved the right to change terms
and conditions; however, they
challenged the retroactive application of cutbacks on the use of
previously accumulated credits.
According to the plaintiffs, such
retroactive cutbacks violated the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act
("Consumer Fraud Act") and
constituted a breach of contract.
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Illinois court rules against
preemption

reference to such a plan." Similarly,
the Court in Morales defined
"relating to" in the ADA preemption

The Illinois Supreme Court
denied plaintiffs' request for an
injunction. The court reasoned that
an injunction would constitute a
regulation of current airline services,
an area clearly preempted by the
ADA. However, the court did allow
the breach of contract and Consumer
Fraud Act claims to proceed, ruling
that these claims were only tangentially related to the airline's rates,
routes, or services, and therefore
were not preempted by the ADA.
American petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari,
arguing that the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision was out of sync
with the recent Supreme Court
decision in Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2031
(1992), in which several states
sought to enforce guidelines created
by the National Association of
Attorneys General ("NAAG") to
govern the content and format of
airline fare advertising. In Morales,
the Court held that the NAAG fare
advertising provisions were preempted by the ADA. The Court used
its previous interpretation of the
Employment Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")
language in interpreting the words
"relating to rates, routes, or services
of any air carrier" in the ADA.
Under the ERISA, a state law
"relates to" an employee benefit
plan "if it has a connection with or

provision as "having a connection
with or reference to airline 'rates,
routes, or services."' Furthermore,
the Court cited the objections of the
federal agencies involved-the
Department of Transportation
("DOT") and the Federal Trade
Commission ("F[C")-to guidelines such as the NAAG because
they were inconsistent with the
deregulatory purpose of the ADA.
In light of Morales,
American's petition for certiorari
was granted; the Court vacated the
judgment of the Supreme Court of
Illinois and remanded the case for
further consideration consistent with
Morales. However, on remand the
Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed
its prior judgment, calling frequent
flyer programs not "essential" and
only tangentially and tenuously
related to American's rates, routes,
and services. Once again, the
Supreme Court granted American's
petition for certiorari.
The Court found that
plaintiffs' claims did "relate to"
airline rates, routes, or services and
rejected the Illinois Supreme Court's
distinction between "essential" and
"tangential" matters. The Court
moved on to address the issue of
interpreting the words "[N]o state ...
shall enact or enforce any law ... " in

the ADA preemption clause.
Specifically, the Court considered
whether the preemption clause
applied to either the Consumer
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Fraud Act claims or the breach of
contract claims asserted by plaintiffs.

Consumer fraud statutes
conflict with ADA's
deregulatory purpose
The Court analogized the
Consumer Fraud Act to the NAAG
guidelines that were preempted in
Morales, accepting the argument of
the United States as amicus curiae
that such legislation prescribes and
controls the airlines' conduct (for
example, instructing airlines on
appropriate language to use in
advertising). The Court concluded
that the Consumer Fraud Act
conflicted with the deregulatory
purpose of the ADA by "serv[ing] as
a means to guide and police the
marketing practices of the airlines."
Therefore, it held that the Consumer
Fraud Act was preempted by the
ADA.

Court finds that contract
terms are private obligations
American asserted that
"Congress could hardly have
intended to allow the States to
hobble [competition for airline
passengers] through the application
of restrictive state laws." Although
the Court agreed with this argument,
it refused to apply the ADA preemption clause to suits seeking recovery
"solely for the airline's alleged
breach of its own, self-imposed
1995-1996

undertakings." The United States
argued that terms and conditions
offered by airlines and accepted by
passengers are private obligations
and not the same as a state's
enactment or enforcement of a law
or other provision having the force
and effect of law.
In recognizing the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, the
Court relied on its reasoning in
Morales that the ADA was designed
to promote "maximum reliance on
competitive market forces," and on
the assertion by the United States
that "[t]he stability and efficiency of
the market depend fundamentally on
the enforcement of agreements
freely made." Although American
argued that it should be the role of
the DOT to monitor the airlines, the
Court rejected this argument,
maintaining that the DOT has never
taken the place of the courts in
adjudicating airline contract
disputes. Furthermore, according to
the United States, the DOT lacks the
authority and the resources to
resolve contract disputes.
Finally, the Court justified
its conclusion that state law breach
of contract claims are not preempted
by the ADA by referring to the
Federal Aviation Act's ("FAA")
saving clause, which preserves "the
remedies now existing at common
law or by statute." Reading the
FAA's saving clause together with
the ADA's preemption clause, the
Court held that states cannot impose
substantive standards relating to
airline rates, routes, or services, but

must provide relief to parties with
proven breach of contract claims
based on terms privately agreed to
by the airline.

Dissenting opinions take
opposite positions
In his opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part, Justice
Stevens agreed with the majority
that the ADA does not preempt the
plaintiffs' breach of contract claims.
However, he argued that the
Consumer Fraud Act claims should
not be preempted either. Justice
Stevens distinguished the Consumer
Fraud Act from the NAAG guidelines in Morales, noting that the
Consumer Fraud Act does not
instruct airlines specifically about
marketing their services. Rather, it
prohibits all businesses from
defrauding their customers. Reasoning that state laws against breach of
contract are no different than state
laws against fraud, Justice Stevens
agreed with the entire judgment of
the Illinois Supreme Court that the
ADA should not preempt any of the
plaintiffs' claims.
In Justice O'Connor's
opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, she maintained
that none of the plaintiffs' claims
should proceed. Although she agreed
with Justice Stevens that general
breach of contract laws are no
different than general consumer
fraud statutes, Justice O'Connor did
not agree that Morales is distinRecent Cases 0 11

guishable from the present case. She
observed that the guidelines in
Morales were not in themselves
"law," but invoked generally
applicable consumer fraud statutes
to enforce the NAAG guidelines
relating to rates, routes, or services.
Justice O'Connor reasoned that
consumer fraud statutes not facially
related to airlines were preempted in
Morales because the subject matter
of the action related to airline rates.
Similarly, the Illinois Consumer
Fraud Act at issue in this case also

should be preempted because the
subject matter of the contract the
plaintiffs sought to enforce related to
airline rates and services. According
to Justice O'Connor, Morales is
indistinguishable from the present
case, and therefore both the plaintiffs' breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act claims should be
preempted by the ADA. However,
Justice O'Connor acknowledged that
personal injury claims against
airlines are not always preempted
under her view of Morales. She

distinguished many personal injury
claims as not relating to airline
services, but rather relating to safety.
In summary, although the
dissenters took opposite positions on
ADA preemption, the majority of
the Court followed the middle
ground, barring the plaintiffs' claims
against American Airlines based on
state consumer fraud statutes, but
allowing them to seek enforcement
of contract terms agreed to by the
airline.

Coors wins battle over beer labels
by Russell Collins
Beer drinkers may now know exactly how
much alcohol is in their drink of choice. The United
States Supreme Court recently struck a federal ban on
labeling beer with its alcohol content in Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Company, 115 S.Ct. 1585 (1995).
Since 1935, the Federal Alcohol Administration
Act ("FAAA") has banned the disclosure of beer alcohol
content on labels. The post-prohibition statute established federal rules governing the distribution, production and importation of alcohol; and created the Federal
Alcohol Administration. The FAAA empowered the
Secretary of the Treasury to regulate alcohol packaging
through § 205(e)(2), which then delegated the power to
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF').
The ATF then enacted 27 C.F.R. § 7.26(a), which
prohibited the disclosure of alcohol content on labels
and in advertisements in states that did not have legislation mandating its inclusion on beer labels.
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ATF rejects proposed Coors label
In 1987, the ATF rejected Coors' proposed beer
label design and advertising campaign pursuant to its
regulations. Both the label and ad campaign disclosed
the alcohol content of Coors beer. Coors responded by
filing suit in Colorado District Court against the Secretary of the Treasury. The court granted injunctive relief
barring enforcement of the alcohol content disclosure
ban, but the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded,
emphasizing the government's substantial interest in
suppressing alcohol "strength wars."
On remand, the district court again invalidated
the label ban; however, it upheld the prohibition against
using the alcohol content of beer in advertising. Although the government requested review of the label ban
nullification, Coors did not challenge the legitimacy of
the advertising restriction. The Tenth Circuit affirmed
the later district court decision nullifying the label
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